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INTRODUCTION
“He seemed like a completely regular customer until afterwards,” Rachel
said of her experience with a police officer.1 Rachel, an Alaskan prostitute,
had posted an escort ad online and quickly received a reply from a man.2
Unbeknownst to her at the time, Rachel was setting herself up with a police
officer who was conducting an undercover sting operation on her.3 After the
sexual encounter was concluded, the man identified himself as a cop and
attempted to arrest Rachel.4 Thinking quickly, she stated that the sexual
contact was not conducted for business but for pleasure, and she
subsequently ran to her car leaving the money payment behind.5 After the
encounter, Rachel stated, “I felt violated. It was a horrible experience. It
was like, because he had a badge, it was okay—he could just do it.”6
Unfortunately, Rachel’s story is not unique.7 Sex work, specifically
prostitution, is one of the lowest-level offenses in the criminal code, and yet
prostitutes in the United States often face the most severe abuse and unjust
treatment by police officers.8 The legal definition of prostitution often sets
an incredibly low standard for an arrest, where prostitutes are arrested merely
by agreeing or implying to participate in a transaction without actually
having any sort of sexual activity for payment.9 This low bar for prostitution

1. See Sirian Kale, Police Are Allegedly Sleeping with Sex Workers Before
Arresting Them, VICE (May 3, 2017), https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/59mbkx/
police-are-allegedly-sleeping-with-sex-workers-before-arresting-them (describing how
a prostitute felt violated when discovering that her client was actually an undercover
police officer).
2. See id. (describing how Rachel inadvertently contacted a police officer).
3. See id. (stating how Rachel answered a “hotel out-call” after she received a
response on an online advertisement she posted).
4. See id. (explaining how the police officer told Rachel he was going to arrest her
after they had sex to completion).
5. See id. (describing how Rachel tried to justify the sexual encounter with the
police officer to avoid being arrested).
6. Id.
7. See Urban Justice Center, Revolving Door: An Analysis of Street-Based
Prostitution in New York City (2003), http://sexworkersproject.org/downloads/
RevolvingDoor.pdf (explaining that thirty percent of survey respondents said they had
been threatened with violence by police officers and twenty-seven percent described
police officer sexual harassment).
8. See MELISSA HOPE DITMORE, PROSTITUTION AND SEX WORK, at xxiii (2011)
(explaining that prostitutes are very vulnerable in society because they often cannot seek
help from the police since their form of employment is criminalized).
9. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 230.00 (McKinney 1967) (stating that a mere agreement
or offer to engage in sexual conduct with another person in return for a fee is considered
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is harmful because it gives police officers the power to arrest suspects who
have not engaged in the actual transaction of sexual activity for payment.10
The legal standard is not the only issue. Another significant problem is
sexual contact between police officers and the prostitutes that they
investigate.11 Police officers face a significant hurdle when working
prostitution stings because undercover police officers need to act like
credible “johns.”12 Many undercover police officers participate in sexual
contact with prostitutes to deceive prostitutes into believing that they are
legitimate clients, subsequently arrest them, and then utilize the sexual
contact and exchange of money as evidence.13 Not only is this practice
invasive, but it also brings up significant issues of prostitutes’ due process
rights.14 The Constitution grants people the right to bodily integrity, and
these investigatory procedures specifically violate a suspected prostitute’s
right to bodily autonomy by attaining sexual contact through fraudulent
means.15
This Comment argues that to accurately prove the crime of prostitution the
law must require sexual contact in exchange of payment.16 But in the context
of undercover sting operations, an undercover police officer’s sexual contact
with a prostitute violates the prostitute’s, or suspected prostitute’s, due
process rights.17 This paradox calls for the prohibition of undercover sting

prostitution).
10. See id. (asserting that the physical act of sex in exchange for payment is not
necessary to prove prostitution).
11. See Kelley Frances Stieler, The Government Ménage à Trois: Unraveling the
Government Sex Partner in Undercover Prostitution Stings, 15 WASH. & LEE J. C.R. &
SOC. JUST. 453, 455 (2009) (quoting “news articles across the country have reported
cases where sexual contact occurred during prostitution sting operations”).
12. See Phillip Walters, Would a Cop Do This: Ending the Practice of Sexual
Sampling in Prostitution Stings, 29 Law & Ineq. 451, 453 (2011) (stating that officers
engage in sexual conduct with prostitutes to avoid being uncovered as police officers).
13. See id. (explaining how undercover police officers have been willing to engage
in sexual conduct with prostitutes in order to obtain evidence against them).
14. See Commonwealth v. Sun Cha Chon, 983 A.2d 784, 785 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2009)
(positing whether the police and their confidential informant’s engagement in sexual acts
with plaintiff four times were outrageous enough to violate the plaintiff’s right to due
process).
15. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 705 (1997) (stating that the
Constitution places limits on a state’s right to interfere with a person’s decisions about
bodily integrity).
16. See infra Part II (C) (asserting that requiring an exchange of payment for sexual
contact more accurately represents the crime of prostitution).
17. See infra Part II (B) (explaining that the invasiveness of sexual contact directly
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operations when used to uncover prostitution because there is no efficient or
effective means of utilizing an undercover prostitution sting to arrest
suspected prostitutes without violating the suspect’s due process right to
bodily integrity.18 Part I will provide a legal definition of prostitution and
the elements necessary to prove the crime.19 Part I will also discuss how
consent is affected when police officers lie to suspects about their
identities.20 Lastly, Part I will compare different prostitution laws and cases
dealing directly with sexual contact to demonstrate the pervasiveness of this
police practice.21 Part II will analyze the different jurisprudential approaches
to sexual contact between police officers and prostitutes, specifically the
tests utilized by the courts to understand police officers’ role in investigating
prostitution.22 The analysis will focus on the legal standard for prostitution
and explain that the standard is too expansive because it unfairly targets
people who have not actually committed the act that the law is trying to
eliminate.23 Part III will propose a new, heightened standard which narrows
the legal elements of prostitution to the actual exchange of payment for
sexual activity.24 Additionally, Part III will discuss a possible solution to the
vexing problem of sexual contact during prostitution investigation: the
elimination of undercover prostitution stings.25 Part IV will summarize the
importance of actual sexual contact in exchange for payment to prove
prostitution while reiterating that undercover police officers should not use
this standard to initiate sexual contact with prostitutes because it is a
involves bodily integrity).
18. See infra Part III (concluding that sexual contact between an undercover police
officer and a suspect is a violation of the suspect’s due process right to bodily integrity).
19. See infra Part I (A) (discussing the legal definition of prostitution and the
elements needed to prove the crime).
20. See infra Part I (B) (posing the complex problem of consent within the context
of sexual contact between police officers and the suspected prostitutes that they
investigate).
21. See infra Part I (C) (citing different instances and cases where police officers
have participated in sexual contact with suspected prostitutes).
22. See infra Part II (A) (focusing on the Cuervelo three-part Test to determine
government outrageousness and the Burkland outrageousness analysis).
23. See infra Part II (C) (stating that having such a low legal standard to establish
the crime of prostitution allows police officers to arrest without the exchange of payment
for sexual activity).
24. See infra Part III (stating that a new definition should require an actual exchange
of payment for sexual contact or services).
25. See infra Part III (explaining that eliminating undercover stings for prostitution
would be an effective way of solving the problem of sexual contact between police
officers and suspected prostitutes).
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violation of a suspected prostitute’s due process rights.26
I.

BACKGROUND

A. Defining “Sex Worker” and “Prostitute”
The contemporary term “sex work” casts a wide umbrella that covers a
variety of different activities. It is necessary to define it to be able to
accurately and effectively discuss its legal impact.27 The term sex work
refers to adults who “exchange sexual services for money which necessarily,
but not exclusively, include direct physical sexual contact with clients.”28
Sex work can include prostitution, stripping, pornography, phone sex, escort
services, and erotic masseurs.29
This Comment will focus specifically on the crime of prostitution, one
form of sex work.30 Although modern sex workers’ rights groups prefer the
term “sex worker,” this Comment will use the term “prostitute” to
differentiate from other forms of sex work.31 State and local laws in fortynine states, as well as four Nevada counties, prohibit prostitution.32 The legal
consequences for prostitution vary by jurisdiction, but generally prostitution
is considered a misdemeanor and the punishment ranges from a fine to
imprisonment for up to two years.33
Many jurisdictions now require an exchange of money and an offer for
sexual activity to prove prostitution—no sexual contact is necessary.34
26. See infra Part IV (concluding that sexual contact by undercover police officers
during prostitution stings should be considered outrageous behavior and banned).
27. See DITMORE, supra note 8, at xviii-xix (explaining how sex work can
encompass a variety of different types of professions, such as street prostitution,
stripping, or escorting services).
28. See Sex Work 101, PEERS VICTORIA RESOURCES SOCIETY (Sep. 30, 2019),
https://www.safersexwork.ca/sex-work-101/ (explaining the contemporary definition of
sex work).
29. See id. (explaining that those who exchange sexual services for money include a
variety of different professions).
30. See id. (listing different types of sex work).
31. See DITMORE, supra note 8, at xviii-xix (clarifying that the term “prostitution” is
more accurate for academic and historical purposes).
32. See Prostitution, Definitions of Prostitution, JUSTIA (Sep. 30, 2019),
https://www.justia.com/criminal/offenses/sex-crimes/prostitution
(stating
that
prostitution is banned throughout the United States, except in twelve of Nevada’s sixteen
counties).
33. See 18 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5902 (West 2012) (defining
prostitution in the first, second, and third degree as misdemeanor crimes).
34. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.321 (West 2011) (asserting that “prostitution”
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Although the courts have held that contact is unnecessary to prove
prostitution, officers still use sexual contact to gather more evidence to prove
the crime beyond a reasonable doubt, and avoiding “cop checking.”35 Most
states have outlawed actual intercourse in undercover sting operations, but
courts have not set many boundaries regarding other types of sexual contact
in undercover prostitution sting operations.36
B. Consent and Prostitution
It is necessary to understand the role of consent when police officers
investigate prostitution.37 When discussing sex and intercourse, the majority
of states have agreed that a person can withdraw consent.38 In many cases,
consent can be key in analyzing whether there has been a violation of due
process rights.39 Since consent is revocable, it is possible that a prostitute
agrees to have sex in exchange for money, but revokes consent before the
sexual act can occur.40 In this scenario, a suspect has not engaged in an
exchange of money for a sexual act, removing the reason for an arrest.41 It
means being hired, offering to be hired, or agreeing to be hired by another individual to
engage in sexual penetration or sexual contact).
35. See Sam Eifling, Above the Law, Under the Sheets, THE NEW REPUBLIC (Jan. 28,
2015), https://newrepublic.com/article/120879/ can-police-legally-have-sex-prostitutesonly-michigan (defining “cop-checking” as when a prostitute initiates sexual contact to
determine whether the person is a client or a cop).
36. See Dylan Sagelbaum, ‘At What Point do They Stop?’ Tactics in Prostitution
Stings Raise Questions in Pa., YORK DAILY RECORD (May 6, 2019), https://
www.ydr.com/story/news/watchdog/2019/05/06/investigation-undercover-prostitutionsting-cases-pennsylvania-police/3344293002/ (discussing how the lack of policies and
standards have created a lack of boundaries for police departments).
37. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 261.6 (West 2019) (stating that consent requires the
person to act voluntarily and have knowledge of the nature of the act or transaction
involved); see also Rachael Urbansky, Seducing the Target: Sexual Intercourse as
Outrageous Government Conduct, 50 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 729, 740, 752 (2000)
(stating that “consent obtained through fraud or misrepresentation can be viewed as nonconsent in some circumstances”).
38. See § 609.321 (stating that consent must be freely given to perform a sexual act).
39. See generally Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952) (discussing that
police officers must not use methods that offend the Due Process Clause).
40. See § 261.6 (explaining that consent can be revocable at any time since consent
must be voluntary).
41. See Commonwealth v. DeStefanis, 658 A.2d 416, 420 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995)
(asserting that the “mere offer” is dispositive to prove prostitution, and that no touching
needs to occur); see also People v. Costello, 395 N.Y.S.2d 139, 141 (Sup. Ct. 1977)
(stating that a person can be guilty of prostitution when they agree or offer to engage in
sexual conduct in return for payment).
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is also important to analyze whether consent is possible when an undercover
police officer misrepresents himself to attain a prostitute’s consent, then
engaging in sexual contact.42 Consent obtained through fraudulent means
and misrepresentations can hardly count as actual consent; a prostitute is
unaware that the person they are having sexual contact with will
subsequently arrest them.43
C. Vice Cops and Undercover Sting Operations
To fully understand the complicated and amorphous legal history of
prostitution and criminal law, we must understand the investigatory context
of prostitution and police officers.44 Attempting to police prostitution has
proved more difficult than other crimes.45 A significant issue arising from
attempts to police prostitution is the fact that it tends to be a consensual act
between two adults.46 Additionally, the transaction of sex or sexual contact
is usually done in private.47 To combat this difficulty, police officers have
set up “undercover stings” to break up prostitution rings and make arrests.48
In these undercover stings, police officers will pose as “johns” and solicit
sex in exchange for money from the suspects to prove they are in fact
engaging in prostitution.49
In these situations, many prostitutes have the erroneous belief that
undercover police officers will not participate or engage in sexual contact
with them.50 Prostitutes have therefore begun asking potential “johns” to
42. See State v. Kelso-Christy, 911 N.W.2d 663, 664 (Iowa 2018) (holding that if a
person’s consent to engage in a sexual encounter was obtained through the other actor’s
fraudulent misrepresentations that he is someone else there is no consent).
43. See id. at 673 (concluding that the identity of a sexual partner is significant
because people must be free to decide who their sexual partners will be).
44. See generally Stieler, supra note 11, at 463 (explaining how law enforcement
can be problematic in its enforcement of prostitution bans).
45. See Roger Park, The Entrapment Controversy, 60 MINN. L. REV.
163, 164 (1976) (explaining that police have had to utilize undercover police officers to
expose acts of prostitution).
46. See id. (asserting that consensual prostitution is hard to detect since the crime
usually occurs in private).
47. See id. (stating that prostitution is difficult to detect because none of the
participants are likely to complain).
48. See Walters, supra note 12, at 453 (stating that undercover police officers are
willing to engage in sexual contact with prostitutes in order to obtain evidence against
them).
49. See id. at 462 (arguing that some police officers believe it is necessary to engage
in sexual contact with suspected prostitutes to dispel suspicion).
50. See State v. Crist, 281 N.W.2d 657, 658 (Minn. 1979) (finding that a defendant

Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2020

7

American University Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law, Vol. 28, Iss. 3 [2020], Art. 4

478

JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAW

[Vol. 28:3

engage in some type of sexual contact to prove whether or not they are
undercover police officers.51 Prostitutes believe that an officer will refuse
this contact, but in reality, law enforcement agencies and courts frequently
allow undercover police officers to engage in sexual contact in order to prove
the crime of prostitution.52
Police departments rarely write policies to ensure that prostitution
investigations are conducted properly or to explain the extent to which police
officers must go in order to pose as “credible customers to prostitutes.”53 A
York Daily Record/Sunday News investigation into police behavior during
undercover prostitution stings in Pennsylvania found several recent cases
raising questions about police behavior concerning their conduct of arresting
prostitutes to “successfully prove the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.”54
The investigation demonstrated that the lack of written policies in police
departments and the investigative scope that police officers have attained
within these investigations have created the potential for abuse of
prostitutes.55 Ultimately, this sexual contact is tantamount to a violation of
the suspect’s due process rights.56 In federal court, if the government
violates a protected right of the defendant because of outrageous government
conduct, due process principles bar the government from invoking the
judicial process to obtain a conviction.57 The concept of due process refers
to fundamental fairness and, although not easily defined, one can infer due
process to mean that a person under suspicion of a crime is entitled to a just
process of investigation.58 Although lower courts have used the principle of
asked an undercover officer to expose his penis to her as proof he was not a police
officer).
51. See Stieler, supra note 11, at 464 n.3939 (describing an instance of “copchecking” when an undercover police officer convinced a prostitute he was not a cop by
touching her breast).
52. See Kale, supra note 1 (explaining that it is not specifically illegal for police
officers in many states to have sexual contact with prostitutes during sting operations).
53. See Sagelbaum, supra note 36 (stating that police departments often do not
outline what conduct is prohibited in an undercover prostitution sting).
54. See id. (investigating cases where undercover police officers have engaged in
sexual contact with suspects).
55. See id. (stating that the lack of policies allow police officers to victimize suspects
when investigating prostitution).
56. See Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952) (holding that the officers’
behavior was so shocking that it violated the Constitution).
57. See United States v. Cuervelo, 949 F.2d 559, 565 (2d Cir. 1991) (asserting that
if police officers utilize methods that violate a suspect’s due process rights, the courts
can ban the government from convicting the suspect of the crime).
58. See Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 383 (1958) (Frankfurter, J.,
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“outrageousness,” the Supreme Court has been wary to define what would
be considered “outrageous” enough to violate a suspect’s due process
rights.59 Additionally, courts have been reluctant to hear due process
arguments in the case of prostitution and sexual contact.60 It is necessary to
understand that when police officers utilize sexual contact when
investigating prostitutes, they are violating the suspected prostitutes’ due
process rights and depriving them of their bodily integrity by participating
in contact that is ultimately not necessary to prove the crime.61
D. Minnesota’s Impact on the Legal Analysis of Sexual Contact Between
Police Officers and Suspects
Notwithstanding that violations have occurred across the states,
Minnesota is notorious for the impropriety of its police officers when
investigating prostitution.62 Several cases demonstrate that police officers in
Minnesota often use sexual contact as an investigative tool during
undercover operations.63 Minnesota is often discussed within the context of
sexual contact during undercover prostitution stings because the cases
United States v. Cuervelo and State v. Burkland helped establish one of the
few jurisprudential standards regarding acceptable sexual behavior between
police officers and suspects.64
In Cuervelo, the Second Circuit developed a test to determine whether
sexual contact between a police officer and a suspect is appropriate or

concurring) (stating that police conduct used to ensnare suspects into committing crime
is not to be tolerated).
59. See State v. Morris, 272 N.W.2d 35, 36 (Minn. 1978) (explaining that the
Supreme Court has never defined what constitutes a violation of due process under the
outrageousness standard).
60. See United States v. Jones, 13 F.3d 100, 104 (4th Cir. 1993) (stating that courts
have ubiquitously rejected the application of the outrageous conduct defense).
61. See Does v. District of Columbia, 374 F. Supp. 2d 107, 118 (D.D.C. 2005)
(holding that the right to bodily integrity is of “constitutional magnitude”).
62. See Walters, supra note 12, at 464-66 (discussing prominent Minnesota cases
that deal with prostitutes and sexual contact between prostitutes and law enforcement).
63. See United States v. Cuervelo, 949 F.2d 559, 567 (2d Cir. 1991) (establishing a
test to determine whether a sexual relationship between a suspect and a government agent
is outrageous); see also State v. Burkland, 775 N.W.2d 372, 374 (Minn. Ct. App. 2009)
(describing how an officer initiated sexual contact by touching a prostitute’s breast).
64. See Cuervelo, 949 F.2d at 567 (establishing a three-part test to determine if
sexual contact by government agents is outrageous); see also Burkland, 775 N.W.2d at
374 (establishing analyses that focuses on the outrageousness of the government
conduct).
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“outrageous.”65 The court stated that police officers engaged in outrageous
behavior when utilizing sexual contact during investigations if: (1) the
government consciously set out to use sex as a weapon in its investigatory
arsenal, or acquiesced in such conduct for its own purposes upon learning
that such a relationship existed; (2) the government agent initiated a sexual
relationship, or allowed it to continue to exist, to achieve governmental ends;
and (3) the sexual relationship took place during or close to the period
covered by the indictment and was entwined with the events charged
therein.66
The Burkland court used parts of the Cuervelo Test in its reasoning, and
ultimately ruled that a police officer’s conduct in the investigation, of which
included sexual contact with a suspected prostitute, was outrageous enough
to violate the suspect’s due process rights.67 The Burkland court mainly
utilized part (2) of the Cuervelo Test in its reasoning, stating that the police
officer’s conduct was outrageous because he initiated the sexual contact with
the suspected prostitute when it was not required or necessary in the
investigation.68
In Burkland, the court defined the incident at hand as “outrageous”
conduct but ultimately did not provide an exhaustive list.69 The court held
in favor of the suspect and stated that the officer’s behavior was a violation
of the suspect’s due process rights, but the ruling was very limited.70 The
only reason that the court held that the officer violated the suspect’s due
process rights was because he initiated sexual contact, not because of the
officer engaging in sexual contact in and of itself.71 In fact, in Burkland, the
65. See Cuervelo, 949 F.2d at 567 (explaining the test for outrageous government
conduct in regard to sexual contact with suspects).
66. See id. (elaborating on the three different components that the court determined
were key elements to analyzing government behavior).
67. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (stating, “nor shall any State deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law); see also Burkland, 775 N.W.2d
at 376 (holding that there was no evidence that “Burkland’s conduct was necessary to
dispel a suspicion that he was a police officer,” and there is no evidence that it was
necessary for the collection of evidence to initiate sexual contact).
68. See Burkland, 775 N.W.2d at 376 (utilizing part 3 of the Cuervelo
outrageousness Test by identifying that the police officer initiated sexual contact for his
own pleasure).
69. See generally id. at 372 (refusing to give examples of other types of conduct that
would fall under the “outrageous” category).
70. See id. at 376 (holding that the outrageous behavior in this case was limited to
when the investigating officer initiated and permitted the escalation of sexual contact that
was unnecessary to any reasonable investigation).
71. See id. (concluding that when a police officer’s conduct in a prostitution
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officer did engage in other sexual contact, but the court found it permissible
because the suspect initiated the contact and not the officer.72 Ultimately,
the ruling in Burkland is not enough because the issue of sexual contact is
still present.73
II. ANALYSIS
A. The Cuervelo Test and the Burkland Analysis Do Not Protect
Prostitutes Enough Because They Do Not Accurately Define
“Outrageousness”
The test established by Cuervelo and subsequently partly used in Burkland
does not protect prostitutes’ Constitutional rights because it does not define
“outrageousness” effectively.74 While the Cuervelo Test and the Burkland
Analysis led to a significant victory in some cases, the “bright line” rule
necessary for effective oversight of the murky territory of undercover police
operations is not defined, and it is unclear whether it addresses sexual
conduct short of intercourse.75 While analyzing Cuervelo, the district court
stated that the standard for dismissal of a case based on outrageous conduct
is strict, but it failed to see the legal implications of sexual contact.76 By
implementing a strict interpretation of outrageousness and only providing
nonspecific factors to evaluate the outrageousness defense, the courts give
police officers a blank check to operate with relative impunity.77

investigation involves the initiation of sexual contact that is not required for the
collection of evidence, the conduct is a violation of due process).
72. See id. (holding that the first initial hour-long massage which Burkland offered
to perform topless for an additional $30 was not considered “outrageous”).
73. See id. (reversing appellant’s conviction only because the police officer initiated
and permitted the escalation of sexual contact that was unnecessary).
74. See United States v. Cuervelo, 949 F.2d 559, 565 (2d Cir. 1991) (holding that
due process principles may bar the government from obtaining a conviction only if the
government’s conduct “reach[ed] a demonstrable level of outrageousness”); see also
Burkland, 775 N.W.2d at 376 (holding that the police officer’s conduct was sufficiently
outrageous to violate the “concept of fundamental fairness” in the guarantee of due
process).
75. See Commonwealth v. Chon, 983 A.2d 784, 789 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2009) (holding
that the government’s conduct was “sufficiently outrageous” to dismiss charges where a
confidential informant was suspected to have had sexual intercourse four times with
suspected prostitute).
76. See Cuervelo, 949 F.2d at 563 (citing the district court’s reasoning that there is a
very strict standard for the dismissal of an indictment based on outrageous conduct).
77. See id. (stating that the bar for a suspect to successfully assert an outrageous
government conduct defense is high).
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In Burkland, the court faces the issue of vagueness that was present in
Cuervelo.78 The court in Burkland recognized a violation of the suspect’s
due process rights.79 Ultimately, the Burkland court did not specify a
threshold demarcating outrageous conduct.80 Instead, the Burkland court
determined that the officer initiated unnecessary sexual contact.81 However
the court did not analyze the actual contact, did not determine what type of
conduct is or is not violative, and simply provided a general notion of what
it considered outrageous conduct.82 Instead of utilizing the test set out in
Cuervelo, albeit general, the Burkland court only underscores the necessity
of due process protection and reiterates the notions of fundamental fairness
necessary when conducting undercover operations.83
In Burkland, the court compares a prostitution investigation with a
controlled-substance investigation.84 The court explains that the nature of a
controlled-substance investigation differs from a prostitution investigation
because an illegal drug sale is similar to an ordinary commercial transaction,
except that it involves an illegal substance, while a sex-for-money exchange
involves intimate activities between the buyer and seller.85 This was a
successful first step in the court’s analysis because it differentiates physical
and sexual contact from other forms of investigative tools and methods.86 By
78. See Burkland, 775 N.W.2d at 374 (holding that due process protection prevents
a conviction if police conduct reaches a demonstrable level of outrageousness).
79. See id. at 376 (holding that the government engaged in outrageous conduct in
violation of the guarantees of due process when the investigating officer initiated the
escalation of sexual contact with the suspect).
80. See id. (holding that “outrageous” government conduct occurs when the methods
violate the “concept of fundamental fairness inherent” of due process).
81. See id. (stating that government conduct is sufficiently outrageous when a police
officer in a prostitution investigation initiates sexual contact that is not required for the
collection of evidence).
82. See generally id. at 376 (Minn. Ct. App. 2009) (reaffirming the belief in
fundamental fairness but ultimately not delineating an exhaustive list of violative
instances of government conduct).
83. See id. at 374 (explaining the concept of fundamental fairness inherent in the due
process).
84. See id. at 375 (stating that a “sex-for-money” exchange involves intimacy and is
quite different than other vice operations where police officers participate in illegal
activities).
85. See id. (explaining why the court declines to use an “outrageousness” test
established in a previous illegal substance case because the core issues are fundamentally
different).
86. See id. (explaining that the court views sexual contact between police and
suspects different from narcotics stings and therefore refused to utilize the same analysis
established in previous cases).
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stating that there is something inherently different in sexual contact, the court
acknowledges that investigative procedures vary and must reflect the nature
of the investigation.87 The court in Burkland, however, only stated that
outrageousness depends on whether the police themselves engaged in
criminal or improper conduct that was repugnant to a sense of justice.88 The
court did not define the outrageousness factor or what constitutes excessive
government overinvolvement in the crime, but only acknowledged that there
was a violation in the case at hand.89 This framework is necessary in all cases
regarding sexual contact between an undercover police officer and a suspect
because it is critical to understand the role of bodily integrity vis-à-vis
invasive government tactics and their impact on due process procedures.90
The invasiveness of sexual contact between police officers and prostitutes
reflects key issues of bodily integrity because undercover police officers use
a suspect’s body and sexual actions to gather evidence by controlling the
suspect’s body to incriminate the suspect.91 A suspect, regardless of the
crime they are being investigated for, is entitled to inviolability and the right
of self-determination for their bodies.92 By concealing their identities as
police officers, undercover officers are stripping away a suspect’s right to
consent because suspected prostitutes are unaware that they are being
sexually utilized for their own prosecution and conviction.93
The ambiguity of the outrageousness test enables police officers to engage
in sexual contact with suspected prostitutes on a discretionary basis,
87. See id. (reiterating that stings involving sexual contact should be evaluated
differently than other vice stings).
88. See id. at 376 n.2. (explaining that although the factors used in undercover illegal
drug cases are inapplicable in the prostitution context, the question of “whether the police
engaged in criminal or improper conduct repugnant to a sense of justice” supports the
court’s conclusion that outrageous government occurred in this case).
89. See id. at 374 (stating that when government conduct is sufficiently outrageous
that it is repugnant to the criminal justice system and shocking to a universal sense of
justice, it violates the right to due process).
90. See id. at 375 (reiterating how the courts view sexual contact between police and
suspects in a prostitution sting differently than a narcotics sting or any other vice sting).
91. See id. (implying that some sexual contact is justified by the need to gather
evidence sufficient to arrest the target of the investigation for the offense).
92. See Does v. District of Columbia., 374 F. Supp. 2d 107, 118 (D.D.C. 2005)
(holding that the right to bodily integrity is of “constitutional magnitude,” and intruding
upon that right requires a showing of overriding justification and medical
appropriateness).
93. See State v. Kelso-Christy, 911 N.W.2d 663, 664 (Iowa 2018) (holding that if
one person’s consent to engage in a sexual encounter with another was obtained through
the other actor’s fraudulent misrepresentations that he is someone else, there is no
consent).
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regardless of whether that evidence is needed, so long as officers provide
some pretextual reason that justifies the contact.94 Although the Burkland
case can be seen as a step forward, the court refused to sufficiently define
the range of conduct that is considered outrageous.95 This oversight has led
to confusion and inconsistency for cases of suspected prostitutes discovered
through undercover prostitution stings.96
B. Sexual Contact with Prostitution Suspects Strips Them of Their Due
Process Rights Because Such Contact Violates Their Right to Bodily
Integrity.
Sexual contact between police officers and prostitutes strips prostitutes of
their due process rights because such contact violates their right to bodily
integrity.97 The practice of sexual contact between officers and prostitutes
invokes a serious power imbalance between the authorities and suspects.98
This imbalance can lead to a violation of due process specifically because
consent is so unclear.99 A lack of affirmative consent in a prostitution sting
operation can provide police officers with opportunities to abuse prostitutes
because investigations are often secret and the prostitutes and undercover
officers are usually the sole witnesses to the probative interactions.100 By
lacking the clarity of consent, undercover police officers are wandering into
dangerous territory where there is a strong potential for constitutional

94. See State v. Morris, 272 N.W.2d 35, 36 (Minn. 1978) (stating that it did not
consider a police officer exposing his penis to a suspect as “outrageous conduct” because
the police officer claimed that it was necessary to maintain his cover).
95. See Burkland, 775 N.W.2d at 376 (mentioning that unnecessary participation in
sexual contact is outrageous); see also Commonwealth v. Sun Cha Chon, 983 A.2d 784,
789 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2009) (holding that excessive and gratuitous sexual contact between
a police informant and a suspected prostitute was outrageous).
96. See Sagelbaum, supra note 36 (providing examples of different cases where
courts applied inconsistent analyses creating varying results).
97. See Stieler, supra note 11, at 454 (stating that, in sexual contact between police
and prostitutes, there is a theft of services and an imbalance or lack of reciprocity).
98. See Burkland, 775 N.W.2d at 376 (stating that where an officer’s behavior is so
shocking and inappropriate that it is considered outrageous by the courts, it violates the
Constitution).
99. See Stieler, supra note 11, at 467 (discussing cases in which police officers
abused prostitutes during the course of a sting operation); see also Urbansky, supra note
37, at 752 (stating that consent obtained through misrepresentation can be viewed as nonconsent and that such conduct should not be tolerated by the government).
100. See Stieler, supra note 11, at 465 (describing how the situational context can
provide a setting where officers can abuse the suspects that they are investigating).
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abuse.101 Sexual contact between undercover police officers and their
suspects is a physical and legal violation of due process because the sexual
encounter can serve as an exhibition of the officer’s dominance over the
suspect.102 The nature of the sexual contact puts the prostitute in the position
of a suspect while the officer represents government authority.103 This
dynamic is problematic because these sexual relationships are criminalized
in other contexts, but are considered lawful if the government can justify that
the contact was necessary.104
Prostitutes often claim violations of due process post-arrest, after
undercover investigations that involve sexual contact with police officers is
concluded.105 Sexual contact between police officers and prostitutes
inherently violates prostitutes’ due process rights because the police officers
are attaining evidence in a manner that is inappropriate and invasive.106 As
a person, a prostitute is entitled to bodily autonomy and integrity. When an
undercover police officer participates in sexual contact with a suspected
prostitute, the officer strips her of the Constitutional rights to a fair
investigation and proceedings.107 Everyone, including suspects, have the
right to refuse consent to sexual contact or intercourse.108 When an
undercover police officer misrepresents his identity as a “john” to convince
a suspect to have sexual contact with him, he denies the suspect the right to
bodily autonomy because he is obtaining consent through misrepresentation
101. See id. (asserting how undercover stings often allow for potential abuse because
of the intimacy of the encounter).
102. See id. at 466 (explaining how police officers can use their physical presence to
intimidate or coerce suspects into submission).
103. See id. at 466 (asserting that a sexual encounter between a police officer and a
suspect may lead to an unfair power dynamic where the suspect might not receive their
due process or fair investigation).
104. See State v. Burkland, 775 N.W.2d 372, 376 (Minn. Ct. App. 2009) (stating that
sexual contact is permissible when intended to gain evidence of a crime).
105. See Walters, supra note 12, at 464 (explaining that defendants have challenged
sexual contact between suspects and police officers, often utilizing the due process
defense).
106. See Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952) (holding that the conviction
was obtained by methods that offended the Due Process Clause and that the officers’
behavior was so shocking that it violated the Constitution).
107. See U.S. CONST. AMEN. XIV, § 1. (stating that “[n]o state shall make or enforce
any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States;
nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws”).
108. See State v. Kelso-Christy, 911 N.W.2d 663, 665 (Iowa 2018) (finding no
consent when the defendant used deception to pose as another person to whom the victim
did consent to having sexual relations).
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and fraud.109 When sexual contact occurs between a police officer and his
suspect, there is a potential for the undercover officer to use his “authority
and physical presence to subordinate the suspect”.110 When a police officer
utilizes sex deceptively to apprehend a suspect, not only is the police officer
committing a serious intrusion on a suspect’s bodily autonomy, but he is
establishing a dangerous precedent for unlimited police discretion when
conducting undercover investigations involving prostitution.111
The Cuervelo Test, despite establishing a rule, is lacking and misguided
because the test permits sexual contact between undercover police officers
and prostitutes.112 Because of the inherent nature of prostitution, undercover
officers are inciting and enabling prostitutes to participate in an exchange of
sex for money while depriving them of due process.113 Courts have become
increasingly resistant of the due process argument in prostitution cases.114
Referring back to the Cuervelo Test, the Fourth Circuit acknowledged that a
“generalized claim of outrageous misconduct based on the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment is difficult to make out.”115 Additionally,
the Supreme Court has not articulated any useful standards for the
application of the outrageousness defense.116 Courts are often hesitant to
dismiss charges because of due process violations involving police conduct
109. See id. at 664 (holding that if one person’s consent to engage in a sexual
encounter with another was obtained through the other’s misrepresentation that he is
someone else, there is no consent).
110. See Stieler, supra note 11, at 466 (citing Mary Ellen Gale, Calling in the Girl
Scouts: Feminist Legal Theory and Police Misconduct, 34 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 691, 698
(2001)) (stating that there is high potential for officers to use their authority and physical
presence to subordinate and intimidate suspects, stripping suspects of their due process
protection).
111. See id. (explaining police misconduct is linked to stereotypic and aggressive
masculinity which focuses “on the legal and physical power to subdue, subordinate, and
dehumanize the people who become the targets of law enforcement”).
112. See Walters, supra note 12, at 470 (stating that the court in Burkland permits
sexual contact and that any standard without an omnibus prohibition against sexual
contact enables the victimization of prostitutes by law enforcement agents).
113. See id. at 476 (stating that a standard that allows undercover police officers
unfettered sexual contact with prostitutes creates a significant power imbalance).
114. See id. at 454 (explaining that courts are reluctant to hear due process claims
involving allegations of outrageous behavior).
115. See United States v. Jones, 13 F.3d 100, 104 (4th Cir. 1993) (stating that the
outrageous conduct based on due process doctrine is “moribund” and that courts have
rejected its application constantly).
116. See State v. Morris, 272 N.W.2d 35, 36 (Minn. 1978) (explaining that the
Supreme Court has never defined what constitutes a violation of due process under
circumstances that implicate the outrageousness defense).
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that is morally questionable but not “outrageous.”117 The act of sexual
intercourse and sexual contact, in general, is unlike any other police officer
practice because the profession of prostitution involves a person’s body and
the intimacy of the subjects engaging in the act.118 Sexual acts are more
personal than other types of transactions, and utilizing sexual contact as a
means of evidence gathering breaks the molds of typical undercover
operations.119 Utilizing sexual contact as an investigative tool means abusing
an individual’s rights due to the invasiveness of police officer’s
investigation.120
The courts often reject the due process argument and are dismissive of
claims of outrageous government conduct because they view a prostitute’s
behavior as “overwhelming evidence of guilt.”121 In practice, a court could
refuse to convict a defendant because the law enforcement methods to bring
about the conviction directly implicate a suspect’s due process right to bodily
integrity.122 If the government utilizes sexual contact as a method of
gathering evidence to subsequently arrest a prostitute, the courts must
dismiss the charges, as sexual contact is inherently invasive in nature and
cannot be valid evidence in a case.123
C. Current Elements of Prostitution Are Overly Broad Because They Do
117. See Walters, supra note 12, at 465 (asserting that courts are reluctant to dismiss
charges against a defendant when police conduct is “morally objectionable,” but not
outrageous).
118. See Urbansky, supra note 37, at 745 (asserting that physical contact and intimacy
between an undercover agent and their suspect becomes outrageous as a matter of
constitutional law); see also Walters, supra note 12, at 467 (stating that sex acts are more
personal and volatile).
119. Walters, supra note 12, at 466 (explaining that the justifications for sexual
contact between police officers and suspects over-emphasize the agency and free will of
those who engage in this type of contact).
120. See Stieler, supra note 11, at 465 (explaining that fraud involving another’s body
adds a troubling element, beyond that occurring with the mere exchange of tangible
objects).
121. See Urbansky, supra note 37, at 740 (stating that ignoring the tactics utilized by
police officers to obtain evidence because a defendant was “clearly guilty” denies due
process protection).
122. See Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 380 (1958) (holding that courts may
refuse to convict a defendant because, the methods employed on behalf of the
government to bring about conviction are morally wrong, ethically controversial, and
violative of due process, even if the defendant is guilty).
123. See Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952) (holding that the conviction
was obtained by methods that offended the Due Process Clause and that the officers’
behavior was so shocking that it violated the Constitution).
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Not Require an Exchange of Money for Sexual Contact
It is necessary to raise the standard for the crime of prostitution because
the current legal definition is too broad and expansive.124 Because such a
low threshold is required to establish the crime of prostitution, courts are
unable to develop accurate and effective jurisprudential theories regarding
the criminality of prostitution.125 The Cuervelo Test and the Burkland
Analysis are ineffective legal tests because they only address the superficial
issues of sexual contact in undercover prostitution stings.126 The courts in
Cuervelo and Burkland ignore the reality that prostitution’s current
definition allows police officers to violate a suspected prostitute’s due
process rights to bodily autonomy and privacy. The current definition of
prostitution creates a legal framework where an individual is suspected of
prostitution for simply agreeing to engage in prostitution, without either
actually having sexual contact for money or is in a position where she is
defrauded into participating in sexual contact with a police officer.127 The
outrageousness tests enable police officers to go further and engage in sexual
contact with suspects to gather additional evidence and possibly entrap those
who otherwise might have revoked their consent.128 The outrageousness
tests also allows courts to sideline the due process issues by creating a
general premise of what does and does not violate due process, unlike a
bright line rule which is necessary.
The current definition of prostitution should not be maintained. Police
officers are wasting a substantial amount of resources to investigate and
arrest prostitutes that have not even committed the actual exchange of sexual
activity for money.129 Further, the definition creates confusion within the
124. See Stieler, supra note 11, at 474 (citing State v. Thoreson, No. A06-454, 2007
WL 1053205, at *4 (Minn. Ct. App. Apr. 10 2007) (Randall, J., dissenting) (discussing
that sexual contact is not necessary if the elements of the crime have been presented
within the course of the investigation).
125. See id. (explaining that the mere offering to provide sexual services for a price
constitutes a crime).
126. See generally United States v. Cuervelo, 949 F.2d 559, 567 (2d Cir. 1991)
(focusing only on the sexual contact between the government agent and the suspect).
127. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.321 (West 2011) (asserting that “prostitution”
means being hired, offering to be hired, or agreeing to be hired by another individual to
engage in sexual penetration or sexual contact).
128. See generally State v. Burkland, 775 N.W.2d 372, 376 (Minn. Ct. App. 2009)
(stating that officers are allowed to participate in sexual contact if they believe it is
necessary to gather evidence).
129. See Julie Pearl, The Highest Paying Customers: America’s Cities and the Costs
of Prostitution Control, 38 HASTINGS L. J. 4, 769-770 (1987) (explaining that police in
sixteen of the nation’s largest cities will likely continue spending increased amounts of

https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/jgspl/vol28/iss3/4

18

Torres: Sexual Contact Between A Suspect and Police Officers: How Far Sho

2020]

HOW FAR SHOULD POLICE GO

489

courts because outrageousness is not outlined or defined.130 A new definition
requiring an actual exchange of payment for sexual contact or services more
fairly represents the conduct being targeted and establishes a bright line rule
that would be better suited for the courts.131 By providing a new definition
of prostitution, and delineating a new bright line rule for fairly evaluating
probative conduct, courts would more consistently analyze allegations of
prostitution.132
This new standard would have a significant impact on undercover
prostitution stings and drastically change the legal procedure of these types
of operations in the future.133 With this new standard, the only way that
undercover police officers could “bust” a prostitute would be to participate
in sexual contact with the suspect in exchange for payment to actually prove
the crime of prostitution.134 If it were merely an offer, suggestion, or
implication of sexual activity in exchange for payment, a suspect could
always revoke her consent, claim that she changed her mind, or otherwise
renounce the verbal exchange.135 By actually engaging in sexual contact,
undercover officers could prove the crime of prostitution by demonstrating
a transaction based on sexual activity.136 Although this new standard seems
like it would solve the ambiguity and abstruseness of arresting and
prosecuting prostitutes, in actuality, it encourages a violation of prostitutes’
due process rights because it denies them the right to bodily integrity.137

time making prostitution arrests, taking time away from more serious offenses). See id.
at 769 (stating that highly skilled vice officers dedicate thousands of weekly hours
devoted to prostitution stings representing tremendous opportunity costs).
130. See Walters, supra note 12, at 465.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 465 (explaining that a bright line rule is necessary for effective oversight
and legal analysis in the context of prostitution cases).
133. See Pearl, supra note 129, at 790 (stating that an efficient way to lower the cost
of prostitution investigation is to eliminate or cut the undercover preparation needed to
make an arrest).
134. See Burkland, 775 N.W.2d at 376 (holding that although sexual contact was
permitted as long as it was not considered “outrageous,” sexual contact was not
necessary).
135. See Stieler, supra note 11, at 463 (quoting a commentator who stated “[a]s long
as these laws are on the books, the substance of the violation, and its consensual and
secret structure, practically requires a degree of participation by the state”).
136. See id. (explaining that to enforce prostitution laws, law enforcement must
embroil themselves in the crime).
137. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 705 (1997) (stating that the
Constitution places limits on a State’s right to interfere with a person’s decisions about
bodily integrity); see also Burkland, 775 N.W.2d at 376 (overturning a conviction where
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III. POLICY RECOMMENDATION
American society has determined that prostitution is morally wrong and
has implemented laws to attempt to curb the practice. It is clear that
undercover prostitution stings pose a unique problem on law enforcement
and the courts.138 Undercover prostitution stings involve a police officer
going undercover as a “john” and attempting to “catch” a suspect engaging
in prostitution.139 The problem with this scenario is that the laws prescribing
the legal elements of prostitution are so ambiguous that they allow police
officers to arrest a suspected prostitute without evidence of payment in
exchange for sexual contact. Laws permitting an undercover officer to arrest
a prostitute simply based on an agreement to engage in sexual contact alone
are ineffective, and allows for the subjugation of a vulnerable class of people
without the suspects ever actually committing the crime that the law
targets.140
If, as argued above, the legal standard for the crime of prostitution is raised
and the elements to prove the crime of prostitution are narrowed, police
officers conducting undercover prostitution stings would need to engage in
sexual contact with the suspects to prove the crime of prostitution. But if this
change is implemented and undercover police officers are required by law to
engage in sexual contact with suspects to prove the crime of prostitution, an
immediate violation of the suspect’s due process rights occurs. Sexual
contact between an undercover police officer and a suspect is a violation of
the suspect’s right to bodily integrity because the undercover police officer
uses the suspect’s body as a tool against the suspect by engaging in an
intimate sexual encounter to gather evidence for the suspect’s own
prosecution.141
The law of prostitution cannot be narrowed to only refer to the actual
exchange of payment for sexual contact without enabling police officers in
the evidence was “obtained by methods that offended the Due Process Clause”).
138. See Park, supra note 45, at 164 (asserting that consensual prostitution is hard to
detect since the crime usually occurs in private and none of the participants are likely to
complain).
139. See Walters, supra note 12, at 453 (stating that undercover officers engage in
sexual conduct with prostitutes in order to continue to investigate them without being
uncovered as a police officer).
140. See supra Part III (C) (stating that having such a low legal standard to establish
the crime of prostitution allows police officers to arrest without the exchange of payment
for sexual activity).
141. See Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952) (holding that the conviction
was obtained by methods that offended the Due Process Clause and that the officers’
behavior was so shocking that it violated the Constitution).
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undercover prostitution stings to have sexual contact with suspects with
impunity. For the foregoing reasons, undercover prostitution stings should
be banned. Under a narrower definition of prostitution where sexual contact
in exchange for payment is required, it would be nearly impossible for an
undercover police officer to prove the crime of prostitution without
implicating themselves in the same crime and violating a suspect’s due
process rights. Therefore, undercover stings should be reserved for vice
operations when the evidence required for a conviction does not implicate
the sexual and bodily integrity of a suspect.
CONCLUSION
Sexual contact between undercover police officers and prostitutes is a
violation of the prostitute’s due process right to bodily integrity.142 By
masquerading as “johns,” police officers deceive suspected prostitutes and
trick them into participating in sexual contact, raising the question of whether
prostitutes are able to freely give consent in this context.143
Courts are ill-prepared and unwilling to address the constitutional
argument that sexual contact between an undercover police officer and a
prostitute is a violation of the prostitute’s due process right to bodily
integrity.144 The Cuervelo Test and subsequent Burkland Analysis do not set
a bright-line rule defining outrageous government behavior.145 Ultimately
the current elements of the crime of prostitution are overbroad and unjust
because they allow police officers to arrest based only on the possibility of
sexual activity in exchange of money and not the actual act.146
It is necessary to raise the standard for the crime of prostitution and narrow
the elements required to prove it.147 The legal definition of prostitution

142. See id. (asserting that the government should be barred from pursuing
convictions in instances when evidence is obtained through outrageous or invasive
methods because the suspect’s due process rights have been violated).
143. See Urbansky, supra note 37, at 752 (stating that consent obtained through fraud
or misrepresentation can be viewed as non-consent in some circumstances).
144. See United States v. Jones, 13 F.3d 100, 104 (4th Cir. 1993) (stating that courts
have consistently rejected the application of the outrageous conduct defense).
145. See United States v. Cuervelo, 949 F.2d 559, 565 (2d Cir. 1991) (holding that
due process principles may bar the government from obtaining a conviction only if the
government’s conduct “reach[ed] a demonstrable level of outrageousness”).
146. See Stieler, supra note 11, at 471 (concluding that sexual contact should not be
necessary for a police officer to make an arrest for prostitution).
147. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.321 (West 2011) (asserting that “prostitution”
means being hired, offering to be hired, or agreeing to be hired by another to engage in
sexual contact).
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should be limited to an actual exchange of money or payment for sexual
activity.148 A prostitute should therefore only be charged after the payment
is received and the sexual act completed.149 But by adopting such a standard,
undercover cops would need to have sexual contact with prostitutes to gather
the evidence necessary to arrest them.150 This would undoubtedly lead to
due process violations because the sexual contact between undercover police
officers and suspected prostitutes would inherently violate the suspect’s due
process rights by virtue of the police officer obtaining evidence in an
outrageous and invasive manner.151 This poses a dilemma, leading to only
one conclusion: Sexual contact by undercover police officers during
prostitution investigations should be considered outrageous behavior in
violation of a prostitute’s due process rights, and should therefore be
banned.152

148. See Stieler, supra note 11, at 474 (citing State v. Thoreson, No. A06-454, 2007
WL 1053205, at *4 (Minn. Ct. App. Apr. 10 2007) (Randall, J., dissenting) (discussing
that there is no need for sexual contact if the elements of the crime have already been
presented within the course of the investigation).
149. See State v. Burkland, 775 N.W.2d 372, 373 (Minn. Ct. App. 2009) (stating that
sexual contact is permissible if it was intended to gain evidence of a crime).
150. See id. (asserting that sexual contact would be permissible if it was necessary for
the purposes of the investigation).
151. See Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952) (holding that the conviction
was “obtained by methods that offended the Due Process Clause and that the officers’
behavior was so shocking that it violated the Constitution”).
152. See id. at 173-174 (stating that the government should not be allowed to utilize
investigative means that violate due process rights).
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